Putting The Last Four Years Behind Us
[February 21, 2009]

Introduction:

            It’s official, almost, that 2008 was the fourth consecutive year of increasing violent crimes.   It’s “almost” official, because OPD Crime Analysis still hasn’t finally posted the “official” year-end numbers on the Oaklandpolice.com website.  There are a few Dec 31 copies floating around, but presumably they are being “re-calibrated.” This is unacceptable, of course, because we are supposed to be running a police operation based on “real time” numbers.

            Let’s get one thing straight:  Public Safety is not a priority. Safety from violence is a right.

Violent Crimes:

            The FBI/DOJ Uniform Crime Reports [UCR] show that Oakland had 5,151 Violent Crimes the year before Chief Tucker took over OPD [2004].  In the four years since, they have increased dramatically. (Reported)Part 1 Violent Crimes are up +56% percent since 2004: 2004=5,038; 2005=5,692; 2006=7,599; 2007=7,605; 2008=8,016.

            Murders during the past four years averaged 121 per year, the highest since 1995.  Murders reached an average of 130 in the last three years.  Robberies over this period averaged a high not seen since 1996.  There were a whopping +94% more robberies in 2008 than in 2000.    Aggravated Assaults reached a 10 year high, the most since 1998.   

            To put violence in perspective, in the years from 1996 to 2004, before Tucker took over, there was an average of 87.4 Murders per year.  The 121 Murders per year during Tucker’s 4-year term were +38% greater.  In Tucker’s last year, violent crimes were almost +60% higher than in 2000.

            [Note:  One might be a little frustrated when trying to reconcile the Crime Analysis “historical” Part 1 numbers with those reported by OPD to the FBI.  Sometimes they match, and other times they don’t.  That’s another problem.]

Isn’t Crime Going Down?

            How can we really know?  First of all, there is going to be a volatility of “reported” crimes, more so earlier in the year when the reporting period is much less.  The latest (Feb 19) Crime Analysis Daily Report indicates that Homicides are down -70%.  Last year around this time (Jan 31) Homicides were down -30%; by (March 2) Homicides were up +79%.  By the end of 2008, Homicides were dead even. 

            The current administration might like to talk about the “overall” crimes going down, but this is significantly misleading and inaccurate.  All too many crimes, but particularly “property” crimes, in Oakland are grossly under-reported, misreported, or non-reported.  After all, Tucker/Kozicki have been saying all along that they have to “triage” calls.  This means that they condone simply not responding to “cold calls,” those that don’t affect the immediate safety of an individual.  Therefore, it is understandable that their policy would dramatically reduce the number of property crimes reported … not the occurrence of them.

            As an example, the year-end 2007 claims that Oakland suffered only 4,742 burglaries [2008 figures not “finalized” yet].  Is this number credible?  In 1970 we had about 14,000 Burglaries.  Does that mean we’ve lowered the crime rate by almost -70%.  I don’t think so, because in 2007 our Violent Crimes were up +106% what they were in 1970.

Part 1 Larcenies

            Larceny reporting is a good indicator of (lack of) confidence in the police and police (in)efficiency.  One would expect the reporting of larcenies to be fairly consistent as a percentage of overall crimes. 

            California’s three largest cities, Los Angeles, San Diego and San Jose, experience an average 46% of their overall Part 1 crimes as larcenies [45%, 46%, 47%).  The 64 cities in California over 100,000 population experience an average 52% of their overall crimes as larcenies.  If we take the ten most violent cities in California, then we find that 42% of their overall crime rate are larcenies.  This was indeed true for the 38 years at OPD before Chief Tucker, when the average Larcenies reported each year was 46% and the range never went below 40%. 

            Serious Thefts constitute such a large number of the “overall crime rate”, so that to under-report them just a little will significantly understate the overall crime rate. 

            In the five years this decade, immediately before Chief Tucker, Larcenies averaged 45% of total Part 1 crimes.  While Violent Crimes increased each year under Tucker, Larcenies dropped inexplicably like a rock.  Unbelievably, in 2008, Chief Tucker’s OPD reported that Larcenies fell miraculously to only 21.6% of total rimes.  Was this the result of Tucker/Kozicki sending massive CRT Teams to Larceny hot spots???   This must be, because Chief Tucker’s latest CA Daily Report (Feb 19) shows a further drop indicating Larcenies are only 20.1% of overall crimes reported!

            In 2008, OPD reported only 6,134 Larcenies, whereas in 1970 we took 20,222 such reports.  Does that mean the crime rate today is down -70% because OPD is taking 70% fewer Larceny reports?   

            The significance of this is to reveal that if Larcenies (and other crimes) were more credibly reported, about 218% higher than where they are now (Feb 19) to just the average that should be expected (45% vs. 20.6%), then our “overall crime rate to date (Feb 19) would actually be up substantially.  Face it, if Part 1 Larcenies are so critically under-reported, then the rest of the Part 1 numbers are also seriously corrupted. 

            No, crime is not going down as claimed.  It is dramatically up.  The reporting of crime is corrupted, unreliable, and incredible. [See the program The Wire to see how crime numbers become politically manipulated]

Number 1 Excuse:  Understaffing…

            In 1992, when OPD’s violent crime rate was at the all time high, due to the “crack crime epidemic nationwide,” OPD managed to take over 48,000 Part 1 crime reports including 38,000 property crime reports, of which there were 21,310 Larcenies.  OPD did this with 654 cops who worked 35 Beats around the clock and fielded over 80 Investigators. Tucker’s OPD handled only about 30,000 Part 1 crimes in 2008 with many more cops, overtime, outside agencies, money, headquarters, etc…  OPD handled 1,089,807 calls from desperate citizens in 1992, while in 2007 there were 789,336 calls received… The 1992 OPD answered +38% more calls and took 60% more Part 1 crime reports.

            If we look at the five most violent cities in California (over 100k), their average violent crimes rate in 2007 was 11.45 per thousand.  Oakland’s violence was +67% higher than the five most violent cities.  Those five most violent cities had an average of 1.63 sworn cops per thousand.  Oakland has 25% more cops than the five most violent cities in California, while we have a 67% higher (reported) violent crime rate.

            What’s wrong with this picture?

Isn’t Oakland safer than East Palo Alto or Richmond?

                        Not hardly.  Although East Palo Alto claims to have gone to Area Command and a greater Community Policing effort, 2008 saw an increase in Violent Crimes.  Their Violent Crimes rate as last reported (UCR) in 2007 was 7.9 per thousand residents.  Oakland’s 2007 rate was 19.2, +143% higher!  Oakland has 95% more cops than East Palo Alto for the population.
Richmond reduced their Violent crimes in 2008 over 2007 by -11% while Oakland went up about 5% [They also increased their arrests by 10%].  Their Homicides went down -40% and their Part 1 Assaults went down -22%.  Oakland’s’ Homicides remained the same, and Part 1 Assaults increased substantially during Tucker’s four years.  The number of Violent Crimes per thousand in Richmond is now down to 10.5.  Oakland thus in 2008 is almost twice as dangerous as Richmond.  Oakland has 28% more cops than Richmond for the population.

            Just for your information, San Jose in 2007 had 3.86 violent crimes per thousand, making Oakland over 400% more dangerous.  Oakland has 48% more cops per thousand than San Jose.

            One more thing, Fresno is a good example of a growing community with many demographic problems where, nevertheless, they have reduced their crime rates.  Take 2004 as the base year, as example, because that’s the year just before Wayne Tucker took over OPD.  It’s a fair comparison to see what the two Chiefs, Dyer in Fresno and Tucker in Oakland, have accomplished.  Fresno’s violent crime rate has gone down -31% since 2004, the lowest in this decade, while Oakland’s has gone up +56%, the highest in this decade.  Oakland has 16% more cops per thousand than Fresno.
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Hasn’t Oakland’s Crime Rate Declined So Far This Year?

            This is a meaningless observation with the data given.  In the stock market we look at the trailing year, among other statistics, if we are to compare meaningful numbers.  One terrible weekend of Murders, shootings, or robberies, as we’ve had in the past, can completely turn the numbers.

            Recall that in mid-2005, Mayor Brown announced that Oakland crimes were down -11% and he was going to make our interim Chief Tucker permanent.  We finished that year with violent crimes going up over +7%, a shift of 18%.  On January 31 of last year we started down -6% in violent crimes and we finished the year +5%, a shift of 11%.

What Now?

            We can’t face the solution if we won’t face the problem.

            The Mayor at his State of the City Address said that he wanted (a) police reform, (b) community-oriented policing, (c) geographic policing, and (d) creativity.  He’s also mentioned repeatedly that we need transparency and honesty in government.

            This sounds reasonable, but to get these things we have to have systematic and effective:

(I.) Information

(II.) Communication

(III.) Operations

            These can only be brought about by effective Management and Leadership: Management for effectiveness and Leadership for inspiration and motivation.

            We can’t do anything about the violent crimes of the past four years except to make drastic changes immediately.  Chief Tucker’s leaving is the first change we should assure.  I say that because of the rumors/possibility that he is still trying to hang on.  That said, let’s look at the changes needed now.

Crisis Mode:

1.  Scrap the 12-hour shifts and go into a crisis mode of working five days at 10 hours per day [from a base 4/10], placing our cops into the neighborhoods (permanent Beats) until further notice.  This means 35 cops and 5 Sergeants [Lt’s and Captains work regular hours] working 35 Beats on three shifts (plus reliefs), each an extra 10 hours per week.  That’s 87,360  hours of overtime in the next year.  At about $65 per hour as an estimated average we could expect the bill to amount to about $5.7 million.  The Beat cops would love getting a significant pay raise for a year. We don’t have to hire extra cops.  It would cost much less than Tucker/Kozicki’s non-structured overtime.  Cops would work less each day than with current 12 hour shifts [additional extraordinary overtime would be easier] and have three regular days off a week [after the crisis period].  Citizens could count on policing in the communities.
   
   
2. Get cops reporting directly to Mobile Police Stations, one construction project type portable office on each of 35 Beats [see the one in the Police Transportation Section on 6th Street]. That should put police over 100,000 more hours in the neighborhoods. No more time at Headquarters.  Plan purposeful 2-hour overlaps per 3 shifts for office work in the neighborhoods, videoconferencing with colleagues, briefings and spot education, and meeting citizens.  Just the green effect of halting all driving to HQ and keeping cars much more on Beats, reducing cross-beat assignments and less random driving, should save about 30 miles per Beat car per shift.  That’s about 1.2 million auto-miles per year.  At 14 miles per gallon, or less, that’s over 82,000 gallons of gas per year, not to mention the savings in wear and tear.  In other words, more community-policing and less headquarters-policing.
   
   
3. Work the Measure Y Problem Solving Officers on the Day Shift 5/8 so they can be available as any service provided in the neighborhood.
   
   
4. Place a full time cop or civilian in each Mobile Police Station [MPS] around the clock to be the electronic eyes and ears coordinator for cops in the field, afford access for citizens, and maintain organization for neighborhood efforts.  Have the Area Sergeants command their officers from neighborhood command centers.
   
   
5. Set up the Beat infrastructure in such a way as to prioritize call response so that all calls are quickly answered and quickly finished. Also, each of the 35 MPS should have a Hot Line so citizens know the information is getting where it will do some good. When not answering a call or at the MPS, emphasis should be be placed on “stop and park” and “walk and stop.”  We need to engage in the same social/contact base as any large based sales organization.  Know your Beat/Know your Cop.
   
   
6. Double the number of Investigators within current personnel authorization. At one time, with far fewer cops, OPD had 100 Investigators working. 
   
   
7. Immediately combine all ad hoc and disconnected staff positions doing fragmented research and writing all over the place into one Office of Management and Budget.  We’ve got to get real information to Operations, the policy makers, and our citizens.  We’ve got to turn the lights on.
   
   
8. Stop the many dozens of “administrative leaves” per year.  Bring light duty officers in.  Take the badges and guns if necessary, but assign them to the various MPS on the Beats.  We need experienced eyes and ears and people in the Neighborhood Command Centers [NCC].  Have the NCPC’s and NSC’s work out of the NCC’s.  Make the NCC’s [MPS’s] the neighborhood information and interface centers where copies and explanations of reports are conveniently available.  Encourage report-taking there.  Take applications for police applicants there.
   
   
9. Place a moratorium on all outside trips for all personnel for all reasons.
   
   
10. Halt all on-duty “training,” and get a regular program of “education” off-duty, at home, and with Internet or DVD participation.  Set reasonable compensation increments. Have adequate qualificatin and retention testing. Get a “Certification” Program operating where people can’t get critical assignments or conduct critical operations (search warrants) without regular certifications.
    
    
11. Assign command personnel to the Communications Center instead of in their headquarters aviary offices.  Just as military commanders must know what’s going on, where, and when, so must our command staff in order to direct resources efficiently and constantly.   The Chief, Assistant Chief, and Deputy Chiefs, remaining at headquarters, need to have full multiple video terminal status boards and communication capabilities.  Everyone should know the priorities of response, response, response.
    
    
12. Get rid of the past 4-year Tucker/Kozicki “Big SAC” as the primary deployment scheme, except as specific support for specific problems in the neighborhoods.  Carefully allocate limited CRT’s to specialized problems, and keep them focused until resolution.
    
    
13. Get the Beat Health Section working again.  Just as Problem Solving Officers are General Practitioners, the Beat Health Officers, a very small contingent, can focus and follow-up so problems don’t languish or return.
    
    
14. Enable arrestee transportation and holding within our own facilities.  Use the empty and storage-filled very expensive and unused jail at Eastmont.  Use the Jail (what’s left of it) at 7th and Broadway as temporary “holding facilities.”  Build cyclone fence facilities if necessary.  This will dramatically assist street cops, investigators, and also citizens arrested.  We must have access for information to let arrestees go free without putting them through full County Justice system.  We must allow our officers to make arrests without taking them off their Beats.  We must release citizens who needn’t go to Santa Rita.  Increased arrests should be meaningful.
    
    
15. Get the De La Fuente GPS plan into every car.  We’re going to be busy.  Safety and efficient dispatch will require it.  Efficient command needs it.
    
    
16. Let’s keep track of our operations like private business.  Take Costco, as example, where they know how long it takes a checker to handle an average transaction, how many customers are serviced, and other indicators of line efficiencies.  Tucker had no clue when an outside consultant told him our cops were out an average of 78 minutes per call and that 40% of them were absent from their assignments on a given day.  Cutting that time in half would have the same effect as doubling our field forces.  If airlines can fill every seat with computerized assistance, why can’t we fill every Beat?
    
    
17. Install real Personnel Management.  When asked about OPD’s sick experience, the brass had no clue.  Find out who is needed, where and when, and dispatch them with the same efficiency as FedX.  Get a grip of who can do what and who is needed where and when.  When someone is missing, make it a critical absence, deserving up-the-line attention.
    
    
18.  Make overtime count.  My preliminary calculations show we can cut overtime substantially while increasing production and effect significantly.
    
    
19. Forget this absurdity of “watch” commands versus “geographic” commands, and “geographic” versus “temporal.”  Giving names to nonsense doesn’t make it work.  We need command around the clock… hello, it’s a clock.  There is no geography without a permanent Beat system, and there is no command without staffing around the clock.  Have all persons reporting to a superior work the same hours, instead of broad and frequent overlaps as in the current disjointed version of “area command.”
    
    
20. Yes, we can incorporate the letter and spirit of the NSA by making it real and attractive, not onerous and intimidating.
    
    
21. Immediately shuffle existing executive personnel.  If the Assistant Chief position was created to fill absences of the Chief, then surely enough was thought of Howard Jordan to announce now that he will be acting Chief.  Place Kozicki in dual role of Bureau of Services and Bureau of Investigation [they have Captains in charge anyway].  Get rid of the civilian Deputy Director of Administration and save a couple hundred useless thousand.  Place D/C’s Israel and Breshears in Bureau of Field Operations East and West, one each in charge of half the City.  Place one of the brightest guys on the Department, young Captain Paul Figueroa of OIG, as head of the new Office of Management and Budget.  He’s got a Masters Degree in Public Administration, heading for a PhD, and he is City Manager material. Have six Captains, three in each Field Bureau, working around the clock.  
    
    
22. You want best practices?  See what San Jose, Fresno, and other notable cities are doing with personnel/costs/budgets.  We can do better, instead of doing worse.

Conclusion:

            We can/should enact major change immediately. The past four years have put us in the same very deep rut. The violence won’t stop until we recognize it, realize we’re doing things wrong, and get on the right track to stop it.

            The foregoing was written in a single morning sitting, and thus it is only an exemplar. Save all the sloganeering and acronyms for a time when we’ve cut the violence in half.  Stop looking elsewhere when the problem and the solutions are right here.  “Prevention, Intervention, Enforcement, and Sustainability” are meaningful from an arm chair, but let’s get to it.

            Wayne Tucker got too much blind support from a City Council that was not demanding enough.  Everything he asked for was substantially given without his providing any elucidating information or even an actionable operational plan.   Compared with other cities, he asked for, got, and spent money like a drunken sailor, but it was never enough to cover his mantra of excuses. He scurried resources in helpless circles, and certainly presided over a paradigm escalation of violent crimes by any measure.

            There are those who feel we should go on a national search for a new police chief.  I disagree.  It wastes time we don't have for something we don't need. Such desperation is understandable, but wrong.  Don’t forget, the “Boston Miracle” of reduced Homicides, that escalated a Harvard Criminologist to national fame, was discovered actually not to have experienced as dramatic a reduction of Homicides as in unheralded Oakland over the same period.  Hartford Connecticut retracted their recruitment of Harnett who was brought in from New York [of the infamous Oakland Harnett Report] after barely two years, as they returned to an in-house career person who came up with a real plan.  The St. Louis miracles weren’t.  New York and Los Angeles successes were examples of outstanding management and leadership, not program templates that can be copied. 

            Our own OPD people, given guidance and support, can pull it off and bring us in line again.  Citizens would be amazed and reassured about the quality of their OPD personnel if given a chance under real management precepts and credible leadership.  Not even the best car can be driven blindfolded.  We need real and constant information, open and meaningful communication, and an operational plan that is not rooted in dogma or political expedience.  I would offer to devote full time to assist, pro forma of course, as I know others would.  The Oakland Turn-Around would be sufficient reward.