How busy are Oakland cops?
[March 23, 2008]

            Very busy.  However, so is a hamster in a wheel.  There is every indication to realize that Oakland cops are perhaps five to ten times “busier” than they would be if they were more efficiently deployed, harmonized as to efforts, and better motivated.  Two blatant examples are as follows:

1. Statistics reveal that while a 24/7 Beat with 12-hour shifts should require about 6 officers, under the current scheme it takes about 12 officers. 
2. An extensive outside survey indicated our officers consume an average 78 minutes per call.  The old standard to beat was to try for 15 minutes per call (note that excess officers on a call can greatly exaggerate the averages, and many calls are “GOA,” thus enabling the potential of considerably less “average” times]. 
3. Twice as many officers, working five times longer per call, equates to perhaps as much as a potential 90% improvement in efficiency.
4. Fewer officers can be deployed to cover more Beats, answer more calls for service, and also relieve substantial numbers to work in other just as critically important assignments (notably Investigations].

            Too much work; too few cops?  Last year, during 2007, there were fewer calls answered by OPD from citizens than in 26 of the last 30 years.  There were 789,336 calls answered, 4% fewer than in 2006.  Only 4.1% of them were dispatched to officers as "Priority 1" calls.  Yet, an outside consultant, Freesmeyer, studied our data and determined that OPD was overworked and understaffed as none other he had seen.  He reported that officers had only a couple of minutes for “free time” each hour to do anything other than actively engaging in calls for service.  The first to believe this was OPD's Chief of Police, and then of course everyone down the line at OPD, and eventually the policy makers, and ultimately the press.  The President of OPOA announced in a Phil Tagami television interview that OPD officers had no time to do anything because they answered 2,000 calls per day.  Given the public's justifiable lack of confidence in police response, the notion that there are too few officers is universally subscribed.

            Measure Y to the rescue…  The voters were asked to provide new finances to supplement existing police officers, promising to focus the new positions directly in the neighborhoods.  Measure Y provided the financial wherewithal to see to it that 63 officers would work as PSO's, CRT's, or other related violence prevention specialties.    With regard to answering calls for service, there was considerable effort on the part of the current OPD administration to posit that PSO's answering calls for service was a form of “community policing,” while others argued vociferously against this.  Both sides of the argument were right, of course, in that, on the one hand, how could PSO's solve problems in the neighborhoods if they didn't respond to the very citizens who were reporting the problems?  On the other hand, it is right to expect that emergency calls for service, that were perceived to inundate the traditional police forces, shouldn't co-opt the Problem Solving Officers by distracting all their available time.  The sword that will cut this Gordian Knot is a valid understanding of how busy OPD really is, and how (dys)functional it has been in its recent response design and mechanisms.

            How many calls?  There were 32,554 Priority 1 calls in 2007.  This number averages about 89 per day.  Realizing that calls for service do not by any means fall into assignments that neatly into fall into incremental averages, and also noting the availability of statistical formulas that offer calculi as to standard deviations and appropriate correlation coefficients [computer software to deploy static resources for random experience has long been available], let's at least gain a perspective.   Ignoring PSO's for a moment, the Patrol Beat system must work independently in large measure for PSO's to be effective.  A significant measure of independence is critical also for citizens in that Beat officers must be available in a dependable "planned" design configuration that maximizes their availability and minimizes their response times, especially whenever a serious 9-1-1 call occurs.  The PSO's would not be the neighborhood-rooted supplementary force if that did not happen; they would be co-opted and absorbed into the Patrol Beat prerogatives. 

            Breaking it down…Looking at the facts as a businessman might, there are (should be) 35 Beats and 1,440 minutes in a 24-hour period.  That's 35 Beats/50,400 cop-minutes requiring staffing to handle the highest Priority 1 calls [active and potential danger] from citizens.  To get a perspective on what the demand is for resources to handle only 9-1-1 calls… If these calls fell neatly into consecutive increments, our resources, if effectively staffing 35 Beats, would theoretically afford each call about 566 minutes -- or almost 9 1/2 hours for a Beat cop to spend on an emergency 9-1-1 call.  If we throw Priority 2 calls into the mix ["urgent, but not emergency situations"] the total Priority 1 and 2 calls totaled 224,118 in 2007, a much more formidable number.  This "averages" to 614 calls per day.  Dividing that total into the 50,400 cop minutes available yields a theoretical 82 minutes per call. Freesmeyer says we average 78 minutes per call, so that leaves an "average" of 4 minutes "free time."  Well, that would certainly appear to leave OPD completely inundated, and no wonder, it would seem, that we don't want PSO's thrown into this frenzy to also become ineffective for their primary mission - "problem solving."

            Calls in perspective…There is apparently no one with management clarity on OPD today to appreciate that when we had 1,154,194 calls for service from citizens (1988), 46.2% more than 2007, that we actually had more "free time," more specialized units, fewer officers dedicated to Patrol Beats (fewer absentees), much longer tenure, considerably less overtime, no annuitants working, much less high-tech advantage, a great many outside agencies, and fewer civilians and sworn officers on the OPD.  How can this be?  Chief George Hart in 1988 worked with 650 sworn officers and a Patrol Division with 148 regularly assigned Beat officers (three 8hr rotating "watches") regularly assigned to five Districts and 35 Beats to handle 46.2% more calls from citizens than OPD has today.  He would no doubt love to have the 803 officers authorized today, to be sure, but asking for more officers wasn't his solution.  The distinct difference, obvious to those who have witnessed the current administration as well as Chief Hart's, is that Chief Hart led and managed with a philosophy that emphasized Patrol Division as the backbone of the Department, and Investigations as the most essential follow-up.  Oh yes, he also had a fully staffed Crime Analysis Section and an R&D "Division."  He artfully communicated with his own words and writing.  He literally knew everyone on a first-name basis.  He personalized OPD from within and on the Beats.  Unfortunately he had to ride the national trends of increasing crimes that peaked in 1992, but he did so effectively, offering citizens a Response and Investigation apparatus that operated with efficiencies not found today.

            Violence:  Where should we be?… From the high of 10,140 Violent crimes reported in 1992, during the National wave of violence, an appropriate index also of correlation with 9-1-1 calls, there was a significant drop, as an average, to only 5,352 Violent Crimes per year (average) for the five years under Chief Word from 2000 to 2004.  Violent crimes were cut almost in half during this entire five year period from the high in 1992.  One would expect a similar reduction for the need (demand) to have police responding to Violent Crimes.  This was the scenario when Chief Tucker was appointed in February of 2005.  It is enlightening to view what has happened to Violent Crimes in Oakland since Tucker came to office.  Appreciating that the statewide and national trends indicated that Violent Crime actually reduced in number to a level in 2006, compared with the five years 2000-2004, to an across the board drop of about -13.85% lower.   We should have expected Oakland’s Violent crimes to have been reduced similarly to somewhere in the ballpark of 4,600 (from 5,352).  That should have been our articulated target, to at least match secular trends.  That should have been the standard to hold our new Chief, just to stay even with secular trends.

            Violence:  Where are we?  In the three years under the current OPD administration, 2006 to 2008, Violent Crimes have stepped up perilously to a new plateau, averaging over 7,900 per year.  That's a 48% increase over Chief Word's administration legacy, and a 71% increase over what should have been our target (and relative general experience elsewhere).  The connection in this essay is a thesis that OPD is not currently effective in the management of matching its calls for service with personnel deployments.  In other words, before we ask for more cops, we better come up with better plans and management for the ones we have.

            Where are the dots to connect?  It is understandable that a new Chief with primarily a custodial background at the Sheriff's Office, coupled with probably the youngest resident management in OPD's history, will understandably not recognize many of the dots that should be connected.  As example, the "78 minutes" to answer each call is a real clue.  The answer to that clue is not a basis for hue and cry for more police officers, but to recall that in the days of "old fashioned practices" we sought to reach a standard of 14 1/2 minutes per call as a goal.  Many 9-1-1 calls, it should be noted, are G.O.A's [gone on arrival] or simply "false alarms" that require little more than a minute or even a drive-by.  Others are serious offenses requiring multiple officers and lengthy stays.  However, ask any experienced OPD manager from days past and it would be apparent those 78 minutes as an average are much too long.  Besides, hasn't modern high tech afforded even greater efficiencies?

            Fewer officers actually needed?  The implications of aspiring to a goal of 14 1/2 minutes per call are manifold, realizing such a goal would take a factor of 5.34 fewer officers to handle all calls.  Chief Tucker, in a memo, has stated that Patrol should have 300 officers to adequately staff the Beats [and presumably answer calls].  He also stated that Patrol has had only 256 [his numbers vary] officers over the past 1 1/2 years, and alarmingly that 52 of them are absent on any given day.  That seemingly left 204 officers to answer the calls for service.  This squares with my own actual survey of Daily Details maintained for the "three watches" kept in the Patrol Division, revealing an “absentee rate” of about 40%.

            Who is showing up for work?  Again, looking at the "old dots" of past practices, we used to staff 35 Beats on three "watches" with 152 officers (including Wagons).  That accounted for days off, but not other absences.  With illness (2-3 days) and vacations (3 weeks), that number would rise variably from 165 to 172.  From that basis, we programmed (metered) other absences for in-service training, military leave, administrative leave extended injuries, and other reasons, but always kept the number required to staff 35 Beats 24/7 below 180.  Extended absences for illness or injury or for any reason were transferred to Personnel Division and replaced for Patrol Division.  The Patrol Division was the “Backbone of the Department.”  This is currently where dysfunction seems to take hold.  Chief Tucker says that Patrol Officer response [no longer a “Division” or a “Backbone”] takes 300 officers, and all he has been able to muster on a given day is an average 204.  The "old" dots indicate that 204 would be a very generous number, and Patrol could expect, with that number, to fill 35 Beats 24/7.  Yet, admittedly by Freesmeyer and Tucker, somehow only 21 of the 35 Beats were staffed at any one time as an average (60%).  This means of course, that there were times when (as I observed) as few as 14 Beats were actually filled with regularly scheduled officers.  Purposefully, I have not discussed the loss of permanency with regard to regular officers being assigned to regular Beats… another "old fashioned practice,"  With an average 40% absentee rate in this administration, the scheduling of Beat officers has been ad hoc on a daily basis.  One commanding officer had a spreadsheet of Beat assignments that he was able to complete only after coming to work, because no one knew who was going to show up.

            Increasing efficiencies…  Understanding the previous parameters, if time consumed on calls was reduced merely in half (39 minutes), and if 35 Beat officers could be effected with 180 cops (already proven), then the efficiency of answering 614 Priority 1 and 2 calls could be enhanced by over 100%  [with greater efficiency for handling twice the calls in half the time], 40% for having all 35 Beats staffed, and 67% for requiring only 180 cops instead of 300 for Patrol.  The compounding of these enhancements would (have) equate(d) to dramatic and noticeable efficiencies for our citizens.  The real fruit would (have) be(en) to allow Measure Y PSO's to focus on their mission in the neighborhoods.  In other words, more effective management could have afforded immediate full staffing of Measure Y PSO's and CRT's beginning back in 2005, and thus the monies available would have been utilized.  Recruits coming out of the Academies would have been a bonus, noting that inexperienced newbies are not advisable for placement as PSO's or CRT's.

            In conclusion, I've listed in a more comprehensive report 30 changes in current operations that can bring effective community policing and dramatically improved response apparatus with entirely different predicates to current thinking.  The truth in ideal police deployment, in community policing and Measure Y terms, is to marry the old practice of 35 Beats with the new advantages of 57 PSO's into a comprehensive package "plan" that is responsive specifically to identifiable neighborhood needs. The Beat system and the PSO expectations are actually quite compatible, and each can offer a symbiosis not realized before.  The key is to realize that both should fit within a backbone system of parallel Beat designs, and intimate neighborhood attention in current terms.  It is the "Beat" system, modernized into a re-engineered evolution, which must continue to be the "Backbone" of the Department.

            There is no doubt, that with some forward and out-of-the-box thinking, utilizing lessons from OPD's past and the private business world, that OPD could become "productive." 

            One might have noted my repeated quotation marks meant to emphasize "old fashioned practices" and "plan."  This has been done purposely to highlight that progress is made by knowing the past (see Steve Jobs commencement speech to Stanford in 2005).  The current administration has made considerable effort to distance itself from the "old fashioned practices" it fails to know.  We have mistakenly afforded the current administration the freedom to develop a "work in progress" and failed to demand real plans that can be measured.

ronoz